An Incentive Solution to the Peer Review Problem by Hauser, Marc & Fehr, Ernst
PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0703
Correspondence
April 2007  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 4  |  e107
An Incentive Solution to the Peer 
Review Problem
Marc Hauser*, Ernst Fehr
Every researcher knows the experience: you send a 
manuscript in for review and it disappears into the ether as 
you wait, a painfully long time, for the review. As scientists, 
we want immediate gratiﬁ  cation: either accept or reject. 
This enables us to move on with our work, building on 
prior ﬁ  ndings. Alas, the review process doesn’t work this 
way, and from our perspective, seems to have deteriorated 
further over the years, even with the improvements that 
the Internet has brought forward. Some people review 
quickly, while others do not. And yet, there are no rewards 
for the swift or punishments for the slackers. We would like 
to propose a solution based on the logic of incentives to 
stimulate discussion, while also appreciating the complexities 
of incentive provisions. As such, we see this letter as an 
opening card in a game that we hope will help us attain a 
better equilibrium, one from which an improved system of 
incentives for refereeing emerges.
All journal editors maintain databases of reviewers and, 
thus, have details of their histories, including when an 
individual received a manuscript for review, the suggested 
deadline for review, and the date of the submitted review. 
Further, all journals have requirements for a timely review. 
Here’s a proposed solution to the problem that some 
individuals review swiftly and others, extremely slowly. 
Whenever a reviewer sends in a review, the date is logged, 
as is common practice. Next to the date the editor enters 
a positive or negative value that indicates the relative 
timeliness of the review: negative values for reviews arriving 
before the deadline, and positive values for those arriving 
afterwards. Reviewers that turn in their reviews late are 
punished, whereas those that arrive on time are rewarded. 
To make the punishments count, and hopefully curtail 
future transgressions, we recommend the following policy for 
reviewers who turn in their reviews late: for every day since 
receipt of the manuscript for review plus the number of days 
past the deadline, the reviewer’s next personal submission to 
the journal will be held in editorial limbo for twice as long 
before it is sent for review. To illustrate, consider a reviewer 
who is given three weeks to review and turns his review in 
two weeks after the deadline. The total review time for this 
reviewer is ﬁ  ve weeks. The punishment is 10 weeks, meaning 
that his next submission sits in the editorial ofﬁ  ce for ten 
weeks before being sent out for review. Journals reward timely 
reviewers by sending their manuscripts out for review as soon 
as they come in, and if accepted, by pushing their papers high 
up into the publication queue.
Several problems immediately suggest themselves, and 
we address some of these here. First, in the case of multi-
authored papers, only the primary corresponding author 
should trigger a punishment or reward assignment.
Second, though we realize that the timely reviewer is 
only gaining what should be the normal state of affairs, 
our intuition is that it is the cost to the negligent reviewer 
that is most important. Given the documented beneﬁ  ts of 
punishment in a variety of cooperation games, we imagine 
that this policy might well speed up the review process and 
curtail the number of slackers.
Third, if a given reviewer is the kind of person who rarely 
gets reviews in on time, he or she could exploit this system 
by simply refusing to review, or by sending in a less than 
helpful review, thereby avoiding the costs altogether. To 
close this loophole, we would add a further cost: for every 
manuscript that a reviewer refuses to review, we add on a one-
week delay to reviewing their own next submission. Thus, if 
a reviewer rejects two consecutive manuscripts for review, his 
next submission sits in editorial limbo for two weeks. As for 
unhelpful reviews, these occur even with the present system, 
and it is an empirical question as to whether the rates would 
increase under the proposed review process. If they did, we 
would propose some minimal criteria for a useful review; 
anything less would be subject to the same penalty as proposed 
for opting out of review. For reviewers who opt out or turn in 
insufﬁ  cient reviews, the only way to break the cycle of penalties 
is by providing a substantive review for the journal.
Fourth, journals may worry that by implementing this 
policy, they might lose manuscripts from some of the more 
interesting scientists, who may happen to be slow reviewers; 
we fully recognize the distinct possibility that there probably 
isn’t a strong positive correlation between the quality of 
scientiﬁ  c research and the timeliness of reviews. But given 
the hierarchies among journals in every ﬁ  eld, as well as the 
diversity of options, we don’t expect this to be a signiﬁ  cant 
problem for most journals.
For the proposed system to work, the journals must fully 
commit to this policing policy. Journal editors may sometimes 
be tempted to violate this policy, in order to clear the 
manuscript table, but this will not inﬂ  uence the status of a 
reviewer. In essence, editors must punish wrongdoers, full stop.
As humans, we are highly sensitive to rewards and 
punishments, perhaps not as exquisitely as rats in the 
proverbial Skinner box, but close enough. Clearly, the 
review process is broken. It is time to consider a ﬁ  x. We 
have proposed a solution based on the logic of economic 
incentives and the evolutionary origins of human nature.  
Editors’ Note: The problems with the peer review process 
are a source of endless discussion within the scientiﬁ  c 
community. This solution to delayed reviews seems 
innovative, if not necessarily practical. We encourage comments 
online through our Reader Response facility, rather than via formal 
submission to PLoS Biology.
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